(Kansas)Aaron E. Shelhamer vs. Kara A. Shelhamer - BY:HEATHER H.

Link for opinion: http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/Opinions/CtApp/2014/20140418/109365.pdf Title: Aaron E. Shelhamer vs. Kara A. Shelhamer, Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas, 18, Apr. 2014 Aaron and Kara Shelhamer were divorced on October 7, 2009. In their divorce decree they had created a “permanent” parenting plan. Since the plan was set in place there have been difficulties and disputes. On July 12, 2012, Aaron Shelhamer filed a motion seeking an order holding Kara Shelhamer (hereafter “Shelhamer”) in indirect contempt for allegedly failing to comply with the parenting plan and subsequent court orders. The court found Shelhamer in contempt as to the June 2, 2012 parenting time allegation as Shelhamer wasn’t on time for the exchange; contempt for failing to provide Petitioner weekly updates mandated by existing order; and contempt for failing to honor statutory court order to foster the relationship between the Petitioner and their minor children. The court found that Shelhamer’s actions will not be tolerated and is sentencing her to six months in Sedgwick County jail. Then goes on to say that all but two days will be suspended of that jail time and must be served within the next 30 days, and 12 months of probation with the court. Shelhamer filed a motion to alter or amend the order with a motion to stay the sentence. Her argument was that the district court erred sentencing her to a determinate length of time in jail without the opportunity to purge herself of the contempt. Kansas statutes create two classes of contempt, direct and indirect. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of the judge, while all forms of contempt are denominated as indirect contempt. In this case, Shelhamer’s contempt was indirect as it occurred outside the presence of the judge. Contempt cases are further determined as either criminal or civil by character of the sanction imposed. Civil contempt proceedings are remedial in nature and designed to advance the private right of a litigant won by a court order. Civil contempt penalty is intended to be coercive, and relief can be achieved only by compliance with the order. Sanctions for criminal contempt are intended to punish the contemnor for disobedience or disrespect to the court. It is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially, with punitive judgment to be imposed in vindication; its essence is that the court obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice. In this case, the parties and the district court all agreed that Shelhamer was sentenced for indirect civil contempt. Existing caselaw expresses that the sanction is intended to be remedial and must furnish the contemnor the “keys to the jailhouse door” and allow her to purge her contempt at any time by complying with the order in question. In other words, a “punitive jail sentence as punishment for violation of a court order is available only for criminal contempt, not for indirect civil contempt.” Therefore the district court’s sentence of a determinate period for indirect civil contempt in this case was premised on an error of law and was an abuse of discretion and must be set aside. The district court was frustrated and emotionally charged by this case. It was decided in the best interests of all parties involved to direct that on remand, all further proceedings be reassigned to a different court judge. The motion was reversed and remanded with instructions.